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C00002 00002	SCIENTIFIC ADVICE FOR THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION
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SCIENTIFIC ADVICE FOR THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION


	Policy issues with a substantial scientific and engineering
component arise all the time, and any administration needs the best
advice it can get from scientists and engineers.  Here are some relevant
facts and considerations:

	1. From the beginning of the U.S. issues arose requiring scientific
advice and the Government arranged to get it.  Issues concerning exploration
(e.g. Lewis and Clark expedition), geography, the Indians, and navigation
were prominent.

	2. The National Academy of Sciences was created (in 1859 ?) by
Congress, and one of its main functions was to give scientific advice.
Inventors wanting subsidies was one issue.  Remember that Morse (1840s)
received a subsidy from Congress for the first telegraph line.
Its relations with the Government (according to a prominent former
official of the Academy) have had ups and downs.  For long periods, the
Government ignored the Academy, and he said he thinks that another
such period is likely.

	3. World War I led to the creation of scientific advisory
groups which were mostly disbanded at the end.

	4. The big growth of a scientific advice industry occurred during
World War II.  Phenomena new to the military establishment like radar,
sonar, nuclear weapons and jet airplanes were developed to fruition in
time to effect the course of the war.  Moreover, the smartest and most
energetic physicists worked directly on nuclear weapons and acquired
great prestige and influence.  No scientists since have acquired the
prestige of the wartime generation, and people of that generation
still play an important role, even though they're all quite old now.

	5. Sputnik brought a new scare, and the scientific establishment
got a direct connection to the White House through the appointment of
the Science Adviser to the President and the President's Scientific
Advisory Committee.

	6. This mechanism functioned through the 60s, but the scientists
who took part in it allowed themselves activities that contributed to the
demise of the advisory mechanism.  Namely,

		a. They acted as spokesmen for science as a recipient of
Government funds.  Every group receiving Government funds would like its
spokesmen to have direct access to the President.  Presidents and presidential
political advisers see no reason why science as an interest group should
have more access than any other (i.e. the farmers or the arts).

		b. PSAC co-opted itself to the Democratic Party at the
time of the 1960 election.  Their man won, but an elephant never forgets.
What an elephant never forgets is someone who it thinks has done it an
injury.  What this Elephant didn't forget was the PSAC behavior.
As it happens, scientists, like other intellectuals, are mostly liberals,
move in an environment of liberalism, and often take for granted ideas
that sometimes lose in elections.  As a scientist who is not presently
a liberal, I am quick to notice things being taken for granted by my
colleagues with which I don't agree.

		c. There was also a tendency to confuse answering technical
questions relevant to policy with giving advice on policy itself.  Of course,
scientists are as entitled to policy opinions as anyone else.  They are
even entitled to political power if elected or appointed to positions
carrying political power.  Moreover, politicians asking for advice also
like to believe that their policies are endorsed by science itself.

		d. A particular issue on which there has been a large
tendency to wrap policy opinions in a scientific cloak is defense, especially
where it concerns nuclear weapons and disarmament.  Perhaps scientist
have thought more than other people about how bad nuclear war can be,
but this does not entitle some group of scientists to claim that this
alone tells the world how to avoid it.

	6. The post of Science Adviser was abolished by Nixon even though
Edward David, then Adviser, was well aware of the above points and made
every effort to separate scientific from political questions.  This points
to an additional problem afflicting the relations between the Republicans
and science.  Republican ideologists are suspicious of scientific advice
on policy matters.  I don't understand this suspicion very well, but here
are some relevant points.

		a. There is some remnant of pre-scientific views among
conservatives which surfaced in Reagan's remark about evolution vs.
creationism and which afflicts fundamentalism even more.  I don't think
this is the main problem.

		b. Another source of difficulty may be that scientists
see all problems as understandable including social problems.  This leads
to the view that Society collectively should decide how it should be
organized and how happiness should be pursued.  Conservatives oppose this
view and usually think that there are problems to which science is irrelevant.
In the last twenty years, there has been much "social engineering" based
on a claimed scientific understanding of problems.  Many people, including
me, believ that this "understanding" was illusory and still is.  Many
other people, including most conservative but not including me, believe
that such understanding will forever elude us.

My own opinion is that enough scientific understanding of society to
determine policy isn't close to being obtained, and therefore small
and localized experimental steps are better than national plans to
transform some aspect of society.  This makes me a conservative in
practice, since I also believe that each person is (for the forseeable
future) the best judge of his own welfare.

	8. Suppose we try to get above the disputes about how well social
scientists understand society and above the disputes between liberals
and conservatives and address issues of scientific advice.  Whether one
is a liberal or conservative, one should agree that scientists are quite
good in determining what engineering projects are likely to work and
what the likely physical consequences will be.  Engineers are quite good
at determining what things are likely to cost and how long it will take
to make them.  Since the Government makes decisions involving such questions,
it is best that they be based on correct advice about them.  Therefore,
the Government needs at least this much scientific advice.

	This much is quite independent of whether scientists should run
the country.  Should a scientist run for President, I'd consider it a point
in his favor that he was a scientist.  Even Carter's limited nuclear
experience had to be counted a point in his favor.  I'd also consider
it a point in favor of a candidate if he had lots of competent scientific
advice and tended to rely on the advice of scientists on policy issues as well
as technical questions.

	Thus I don't agree with one obvious interpretation of Churchill's
statment, "Scientists should be on tap rather than on top".

	However, scientists now have to deal with an Administration that
gives every sign of taking Churchill's attitude.

	9. The second most recent catastrophe for science advice was the
election of Frank Press, President Carter's Scientific Adviser, as
President of the National Academy of Sciences.  This would have been
unfortunate if Carter had been re-elected, because Press, as was appropriate
for a member of Carter's Administration, often spoke as a supporter of
policies of that Administration, and these policies were often a consequence
of social and political considerations as well as technical.  Press, as
was quite natural, became a committed supporter of such policies and is
still identified with them.

	However, the National Academy of Sciences is asked for advice by
Congress as well as by the Administration, and the Congress expects that
the advice it gets will be as independent as possible of political
considerations and existing policy commitments.  Since not even all
Democrats agree with Carter on everything, Congress would be reluctant
to ask for advice if they thought they knew in advance what answer
they would get.  While Press apparently made it explict that he was
aware of the problem hoped to avoid bias or even the appearance of
bias toward his previous commitments, he should never have accepted
the job.

	While the process of electing Press began before the November
elections, it was completed afterwards.  According to one person
close to certain Reagan Administration officials, it was taken as
a "declaration of war" by the scientific establishment on the Reagan
Administration and the establishment of the National Academy of
Sciences as a part of the Democratic "government in exile".
This was undoubtedly not the precise intent of the 1200 distinguished
scientists who voted for Press or by Press himself.
Nevertheless, reading Science (published by the American Association
for the Advancement of Science) would also give the impression that
scientists are unanimously dismayed by Reagan's election, have no
sympathy with the goals of his Administration, and only wonder how
bad the damage will be.  That this magazine's "News and Comment" section
is written by journalists rather than scientists probably won't impress
any White House officials who notice it.

	It is important to remember that whoever asks for advice, e.g.
a report, always has some fear that he won't like it and that having
to explain to the media why he isn't going to take it will add to his
problems.  Of course, advice from yes-men is useless, but no-one will
officially ask for the advice of those whom he believes to be yes-men
of his political opponents.

	The National Academy is far from being the whole of the
science advisory establishment, but perhaps relations with other
parts of it are in a similar state.

	10. During the campaign and the transition, there was a
Reagan science and technology team including Edward Teller, Simon Ramo
and other scientists and technologists with Republican sympathies.
It has apparently been shunted aside along with many other groups
involved in the transition operation.  Perhaps it used up its
credibility trying to save or promote some programs, perhaps the
suspicion of scientists was too great, or perhaps (most likely in
my opinion) some of its prominent members were involved on the losing
side of other appointment issues (Defense for example).

	It seems likely that the Reagan Administration will not have
an official scientific adviser.


REPAIRING THE DAMAGE

	The Reagan Administration values physical science as is shown
by the fact that the physical science parts of the National Science
Foundation budget weren't cut.  Moreover, the increased research and
development budget of the Defense Department will probably lead to
real increases in some areas of scientific activity.  Science also
has important friends in Congress.  Most likely, the National Academy
of Science still has many good friends in Congress.  Science will live
and the country will survive even if Reagan doesn't have an official
scientific adviser.

	Nevertheless, it would be worthwhile to repair the damage to
the relations between science and this Administration.
This requires changed attitudes on both sides.

	It is easiest to give advice to the Administration.  Reagan
is a genius at conciliation, and he should apply some of it here.
For example, continuing Mansfield as Ambassador to Japan signalled
Reagan's intention to have good relations with the Senate Democrats
and was apparently taken as such.  A similar gesture towards the
scientific establishment, if one could be devised, might have an
effect in the same direction.  Of course, this was only part of the
conciliation of the Democratic Senators, and a similar gesture would
be only a part of conciliating the scientific establishment.  Perhaps
accepting Press in some ceremonial way would help.  The conservative
scientists and engineers, though they be few, shouldn't be forgotten
either.

	It is harder to advise the scientific establishment, because
the most important thing is for a large number of people to change
their hostile attitude, and that isn't a single action.  The point is
that the country is going to experiment with the Republican economic
and defense ideas to a certain extent.  The scientific establishment
should help make these policies work as well as possible and not
merely enlist itself among those working to prevent their being tried
or to minimize the extent to which they are tried.

	Press could help.  The most obvious thing he could do is resign,
but maybe this would only make the Academy members even more hostile
to the Administration.  The most useful conciliatory gesture he could
make would be to take some recent Academy study that agrees with some
aspect of Administration policy and give it some publicity.  An
excellent example from my point of view would be the statements in
the CONAES report emphasizing the role of nuclear energy between now
and the end of the century.  This would help out the Reagan Administration,
reaffirm an Academy report, and help the country.  It would also
relieve some Republican fears that asking the Academy for advice
is likely to result in a replay of some part of the Democratic
platform.